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/'lthough biblical exegesis and rhetoric, from which modern 
hermeneutics derived its first principles, are ancient arts, an 
effort to establish hermeneutics as a universal science, and 
especially to extend its principles to the science of society, is of a 
decidedly recent origin. "There is little doubt," states Gouldner, 
"that hermeneutics' roots in the modern era are traceable to 
Romanticism."1 Why is this so, what makes romanticism fertile 
ground for hermeneutical speculations? Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
a leading authority on hermeneutics, makes this intriguing 
suggestion about its origins: 
The hermeneutical problem only emerges clearly when there is 
no powerful tradition present to absorb one's own attitude into 
itself and when one is aware of confronting an alien tradition to 
which he has never belonged or one he no longer unquestion- 
ingly accepts. . . . Historically it is worthy of note that while 
rhetoric belongs to the earliest Greek philosophy, hermeneutics 
came to flower in the Romantic era as a consequence of the 
modern dissolution of firm bonds with tradition.2 
Gadamer does not pursue the argument much further, yet his 
remark offers a clue for a potentially fruitful line of inquiry. 
Indeed, the onset of romanticism was marked by the break- 
down of a century-old tradition. Precipitated by the French 
1 Alvin W. Gouldner, For Sociology: Renewal and Criticism in Sociology (New York: 
Basic Books), p. 336. 2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of Califor- 
nia Press, 1976), pp. 46, 21. 
SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring 1986) 
This content downloaded from 131.216.164.152 on Tue, 16 Jul 2013 14:28:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
78 SOCIAL RESEARCH 
Revolution of 1789, a crisis of major proportion swept over 
Europe, leaving its indelible mark on virtually every form of 
practical and spiritual life. The romantic movement was in 
great measure an attempt, inconclusive and contradictory as it 
might seem, to come to grips with the legacy of the French 
Revolution. The revolution compelled the reappraising of the 
past and made imperative a conscious stance with regard to 
the present. It underscored the historicity and fragility of the 
tradition. Most frighteningly, the revolution revealed the con- 
stitutive role of reason, its uncanny ability to revamp the 
natural order of things, which established man as a participant 
observer in the drama of history. The realization that man is a 
producer as much as a product of society - this major insight 
of sociological hermeneutics - was first formulated by the 
romantic thinkers in response to the promise and the threat of 
the French Revolution. 
A few preliminary remarks on the meaning of "romanti- 
cism" as employed in this paper are in order here. The term 
has been the subject of an ongoing controversy since the 
beginning of this century.3 Some critics see little use in it 
because "it has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it 
means nothing"4 - too many different authors are lumped to- 
gether under the heading "romanticism," too antithetical are 
the ideas stamped "romantic," too uncertain is the time span 
encompassing the "romantic movement." What useful pur- 
pose, indeed, may be served by bringing under one head such 
unlikely bedfellows as Goethe, Tieck, E. T. A. Hoffman, 
Fichte, F. Schlegel, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, A. 
Müller, Marx, and Novalis? Lovejoy's unhappiness with the 
term and his preference for the plural form "romanticisms"5 
3 The history of this controversy is reviewed in René Wellek, Concepts of Criticism 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), and Lilian R. Fürst, Romanticism (London: 
Methuen, 1969). The best substantive discussion is still Jacques Barzun's Classic, 
Romantic, and Modern (New York: Anchor Books, 1961). 
4 A. O. Lovejoy, "On the Discrimination fRomanticisms," in English Romantic Poets: 
Modern Essays in Criticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 6. 
5 Ibid. 
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are quite understandable. Still, his argument overstates the 
case. What is peculiar about romantic thinkers, as Gouldner 
rightly noted, is that "ever since Hegel, romantics have ex- 
pressed their distance from others by condemning them as 
Romantics'."6 It may be prudent to distinguish those con- 
sciously advancing the romantic cause (we can call them 
"romantics") from those who partake in it without openly 
subscribing to its tenets or accepting some of its forms (they 
may be called "romanticists"), but to deny Goethe, Hegel, or 
Marx a place in the history of romanticism on account of their 
ambivalence about it is to engage in the "petty politics of 
cultural history."7 Barzun hardly exaggerates when he calls 
Faust "a bible of Romanticism" in spite of Goethe's delib- 
erate attempts to put distance between himself and the ro- 
mantics.8 Hegel's contempt for everything romantic not- 
withstanding, his Phenomenology of Mind is an outstanding 
piece of romantic philosophy, deservedly included by Peck- 
ham among the required readings for all students of roman- 
ticism.9 Gouldner's interest in "Marx's Romanticism"10 does no 
violence to the historical realities, even though it flies in the 
face of Marx's well-known antiromantic sentiments. And cer- 
tainly a long list of romantic writers compiled by Isaiah Ber- 
lin,11 which features among others Chateaubriand, Kier- 
kegaard, Stirner, and Nietzsche, is no sign of his indifference 
to the diversity of their respective views. The greater the 
stature of a thinker, the more likely he is to be in a class by 
himself; classing him together with other romanticists is not 
meant to suggest that he is nothing but romantic, only that he 
took part in the romantic discourse, shared in the romantic 
6 Gouldner, For Sociology, p. 336. 7 Barzun, Classic, p. 8. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Morse Peckham, "On Romanticism," Studies in Romanticism 9 (1970): 218. 10 Gouldner, For Sociology, p. 339; see also The Two .Marxisms (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), p. 192. 11 Isaiah Berlin, "Preface," in H. G. Schenk, The Mind of the European Romantics (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1969), p. xv. 
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problematics, and wittingly or unwittingly contributed to the 
vast field of idioms and meanings which sprang to life in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution and signified a break with 
the Age of Reason. 
All this is not to belittle the formidable task facing the 
student of romanticism seeking to unravel the unity of the 
romantic movement. This task is exacerbated by the violently 
contradictory statements emanating from alleged romanticists. 
In the same breath we find them asserting the autonomy of 
the individual and the primacy of the whole, the right to 
self-determination a d the duty to the state, personal respon- 
sibility for the future and the inviolability of tradition. These 
contradictions cannot be simply charged to the factional di- 
visions within the romantic movement, for they are endemic to 
every genuinely romantic thinker; rather, they should be seen 
as a manifestation of the "contradictoriness, dissonance and 
inner conflict of the Romantic mind."12 It is to the credit of 
such students of romanticism as Kluckhohn and Barzun, 
Peckham and Abrams, Wasserman and Schenk that they endea- 
vored to grasp the unity underlying the romantic movement 
without glossing over the artistic, intellectual, and ideological 
diversity of its protagonists. 
The following account focuses on the tension inherent in 
the premises of romantic thought. Several of these premises 
are central to the present study. The first concerns the 
romanticists' political commitment and is predicated on the 
idea that "Romanticism as well as Revolution . . . were united 
in their impassioned striving for freedom."13 Deploring revo- 
lutionary violence, the romanticists remained committed to the 
revolution's emancipatory goals. The novel element in their 
political reasoning was the contention that individual freedom 
is not antithetical to social order, that the former is grounded 
in the latter and can be fully realized only in and through 
12 Schenk, Mind, p. xxii. 
10 linn., p. w. 
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society. The second premise has to do with the philosophical 
assumptions of romanticism and is based on the precept that 
"the romantic reaction was a protest on behalf of value."14 
Whereas rationalist philosophy sought to minimize the value 
component in human understanding, the romantic thinkers 
proclaimed it to be the very condition of objective knowledge. 
The notion that knowledge devoid of interest and a priori 
assumptions is a contradiction in terms is quintessentially 
romantic. The third idea contained in romanticism is that of 
organic unity. "The paradigm of 'organic' unity," according to 
Higonnet, is central to "romantic hermeneutics."15 I will also 
argue that it is central to the entire romantic tradition in 
sociology, insofar as it entails a new image of society as 
Gemeinschaft or free discourse. The above precepts do not 
exhaust the list of romantic premises; arguably, though, they 
form the core of the romantic teaching and are signally im- 
portant for the understanding of romantic sociology and the 
hermeneutical perspective endemic to its premises. The prin- 
cipal task of this paper is to place these in a proper historical 
context. I begin with the examination of the romanticists' 
attitude toward the French Revolution. After reconstructing 
the premises of romantic hermeneutics, I discuss the circular 
nature of reasoning in romantic social thought. Next, I ana- 
lyze the notion of Gemeinschaft as an epitome of the romantic 
ideal of the future community. And finally, I share some 
thoughts on the continuity between romantic theory and 
twentieth-century interpretative sociology. 
Political Underpinnings of the Romantic Movement 
The history of the romantic movement is inexorably tied to 
the Revolution of 1789, which continued to evoke passionate 
14 Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
1938), p. 115. 15 M. R. Higonnet, "Organic Unity and Interpretative Boundaries: Friedrich 
Schlegel's Theories and Their Application in His Critique of Lessing," Studies in 
Romanticism 19 (1980): 164. 
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response throughout the nineteenth century. The first gener- 
ation of romantic thinkers greeted the news about the fall of 
the Bastille with cheers and applause. To commemorate the 
happy events of July 14, young students in Göttingen - Hegel, 
Schlegel and Hölderlin - planted a liberty tree. Friedrich 
Schlegel ranked the French Revolution with "the greatest ten- 
dencies of the age," along with Fichte's philosophy and 
Goethe's Meister.16 Fichte praised the valeur of the French and 
claimed to have laid the philosophical foundation for what 
they selflessly fought for in practice.17 Wordsworth, deploring 
"the baleful influence of aristocracy and nobility upon human 
happiness and virtue," declared himself a supporter of the 
republic.18 The feeling of euphoria, however, did not survive 
the third year of the revolution. The Terror struck, and al- 
most overnight the mood of the romanticists changed: en- 
thusiasm gave way to depression, hope to despair, acclamation 
to denunciation. The awakening was particularly rude for the 
German romanticists, who saw in the French Revolution the 
best hope for liberty in their country, still deeply ensconced in 
the feudal tradition. Even in England, where a good many 
liberties espoused by the French revolutionaries were in place 
for more than a century, the judgment of the three years of 
revolutionary violence was strongly negative. "I abandoned 
France and her rulers," explained Wordsworth, "when they 
abandoned the struggle for liberty, gave themselves up to 
tyranny, and endeavored to enslave the world."19 By the end 
of the century this sentiment prevailed among the romantic 
thinkers. The first decade of the nineteenth century witnessed 
the romanticists' turning away from cosmopolitanism to patri- 
16 Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegels Lucinde and the Fragments (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 190. 
17"Fichtean Baggesen Antwort, April, 1795, m Johann Gottlieb ttchte önejwechsel 
(Leipzig: Haesselverlag, 1925), pp. 449-450. 18 William Wordsworth, "A Letter to the Bishop of Landoff, 1793, in The Prose 
Works of William Wordsworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 3: 46. 
19 William Wordsworth, "Letter to a Friend, 1821," in The Prose Works, Ò: 2by. 
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otism, from republicanism to monarchism, from scientific ra- 
tionality to Christianity and revelation. 
It is this metamorphosis that accounts for a still- 
predominant view of romanticism as a soundly conservative 
movement. Thus in his study of Goethe and his age, Lukács 
rarely refers to romanticism without the qualifier "reaction- 
ary"; Cobban uses the terms "romantic" and "conservative" as 
virtually synonymous; Zeitlin speaks about "the Romantic- 
Conservative reaction" to the French Revolution; Ruggiero 
scolds romanticism for "promoting a reactionary type of 
thought inspired by the pure Junkerism"; and Briefs deplores 
romantic idealism as "the philosophy of counter-revolution."20 
Mannheim makes perhaps the most elaborate case for roman- 
ticism as a paragon of conservative thought. In his important 
inquiry into the styles of social thought, Mannheim identifies 
conservatism with the distrust of reason and formal logic, 
preference for qualitative thinking and dialectics, penchant 
for irrationalism and mysticism, and above all, with the 
idealization of the past: "Acting along conservative lines . . . 
means that the individual is consciously or unconsciously 
guided by a way of thinking and acting which has its own 
history behind it, before it comes into contact with the indi- 
vidual."21 Romanticism, or "feudalistic romanticism," as Mann- 
heim sometimes refers to it, with its preoccupation with 
medieval institutions, abhorrence of radical change, and sup- 
port of reactionary governments, does then appear to be the 
purest species of conservatism. 
Whatever the merit of the above interpretation - and it cer- 
tainly succeeds in bringing into focus important aspects of 
romanticism - it cannot be accepted in its original form. Mann- 
20 Georg Lukács, Goethe and His Age (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1969); Alfred 
Cobban, Aspects of the French Revolution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), p. 26; Irving 
M. Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 39; Goetz A. Briefs, "The Economic Philosophy of Romanti- 
cism," Journal of the History of Ideas 2 (1941): 279. 21 Karl Mannheim, "Conservatism," in From Karl Mannheim (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1971), p. 153. 
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heim's scheme fails to account for other facets of romantic 
thought that cannot be forced under the heading "conser- 
vatism." Too perceptive a thinker to simply ignore the incon- 
sistencies, Mannheim acknowledges "the infiltration of liberal 
ideas into the conservative system of thought" and admits that 
"liberalism allowed itself to be penetrated by conservative ele- 
ments."22 By and large, however, he chooses to explain away 
anomalous manifestations rather than to admit the deficiency 
of his scheme. Yet the whole scheme needs to be overhauled if 
we are to understand the unique position of romanticism in 
postrevolutionary Europe. The uniqueness of romanticism is 
not to be seen in its furnishing a rallying point for the forces 
of the past, but in the romanticists' ingenuous effort to enlist 
tradition in service of the revolutionary objectives of the pres- 
ent. An interpretation that paints romanticism as "a one- 
dimensional negation of liberalism and bourgeois society,"23 
an interpretation first fully articulated in Mannheim's Habili- 
tation thesis and still enjoying wide currency, fails to grasp the 
peculiar status of the past in romantic literature. A simple 
return to the past was not seriously contemplated by the 
romantic thinkers, certainly not as a practical option for the 
future. An ideal past - an organic state of feudal Europe, an 
amiable polis of Greek antiquity, or a harmonious community 
of the prehistoric past - was to be regained on a higher level, 
through the negation of the present. The past of the roman- 
tics is clearly an extension of the present, a resource skillfully 
manipulated to advance a contemporary cause. As Mead ob- 
served in his regrettably forgotten study of romantic thought, 
the romanticists "created a different past from that which had 
been there before, a past . . . into which a value has been put 
which did not belong there before."24 The values the romanti- 
22 Ibid., pp. 167, 139. 
AA bteven Seidman, Liberalism and the Origin of European Social Theory (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983), p. 101. 
24 George H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: Univer- 
sity of Chicago Press, 1936), p. 64. On the interfaces of Mead and romanticism, see 
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cists found in medieval Europe were their own, conspicuously 
modern values of autonomy, freedom, and dignity of man. 
Combined with the ancient virtues of courage, honesty, and 
duty, these values were thought to produce the noble, har- 
monious order of the past. Never mind that the idyllic picture 
of the past was chiefly the phantom of the romantic imagina- 
tion; its function was to furnish a convenient vantage point for 
an attack on the ills of modern society: 
The romantics were no fools. They recognized the great accom- 
plishments of the Enlightenment a d saw the powerful potential 
of early capitalist technology. But they saw how these advances 
in thinking and industry were being used to affect and enslave 
their own consciousness and behavior as well as those of the 
people in general. And the[y] . . . sought to recover the revo- 
lutionary potential of new inventions and fought for the in- 
formation a d formation fa new social order which was still in 
transition.25 
This is not to gainsay that criticism couched in nostalgic 
terms lends itself handily to reactionary ideologies. Whatever 
the intent of the early romantics, they did provide ammuni- 
tion to the ideologists of Prussian Junkerism; their attacks on 
the institutions of revolutionary France delayed the advance- 
ment of civil rights; and their rejection of capitalism helped to 
prolong the agony of industrial transformation i Germany 
and elsewhere. Still, it is imperative to refrain from sitting in 
judgment on the ideological nature of romanticism outside the 
historical context. It is hardly an accident that Hegel, a model 
of romantic onservatism in the eyes of some contemporary 
critics, was considered in his own time as a liberal and an agent 
of revolution, his political writings being denied posthumous 
publication, his influence in German universities condemned 
to eradication by Frederick William IV. Nor is it totally fortu- 
Dmitri N. Shalin, "The Romantic Antecedents of Meadian Social Psychology," Symbolic 
Interaction 7 (1984): 43-65. 25 J. Zipes, "The Revolutionary Rise of the Romantic Fairy Tale in Germany," 
Studies in Romanticism 16 (1977): 450. 
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itous that the proponents of Stein-Hardenberg liberal reforms 
were sympathetic to the romantic ause. As to the romanticists' 
vociferous opposition to the Enlightenment, we should re- 
member that, in the nineteenth century, the latter's univer- 
salism and cosmopolitanism were transformed into a progres- 
sively coercive Napoleonic imperialism, deeply resented 
throughout Europe. The ideological underpinnings of the 
romantic movement were "neither of the Right nor of the 
Left."26 The romanticists looked to the past for a model of the 
future that would be "neither bourgeois nor feudal."27 It is 
indicative that thinkers of such impeccably liberal credentials 
as Karl Marx, William Morris, Gustav Landauer, and Georg 
Lukács have strong romantic backgrounds. All in all, romanti- 
cism defies an unambiguous political identification a d resists 
attempts to put it squarely on one side of the ideological 
battles of the day. Can we say, then, that it lacks a unifying 
political theme? By no means. Löwy misses this point, I be- 
lieve, when he denigrates the ideological multifariousness of
romanticism as "ideological hermaphroditism"28 ("ideological 
ambivalence" would be a more fitting term). What he fails to 
appreciate is that the very attempt to rise above the ideological 
extremes of the Right and the Left is a unifying principle of 
romantic thought. The romanticists' craving for tradition and 
social order is inseparable from their commitment o self- 
determination and freedom. This commitment survived the 
decades of reaction and remained as strong in the second 
generation of romantic thinkers - the generation of Feuerbach 
and Kierkegaard, Stirner and Marx, Emerson and 
Thoreau - as it was at the inception of the romantic era, when 
Schelling first proclaimed that "freedom is the beginning and 
26 Henri Brunschwig, Enlightenment and Romanticism in Eighteenth Century Prussia 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 183. 
27 Gouldner, For Sociology, p. 324. 
28 Michael Löwy, Georg Lukacs-From Romanticism to Bolshevism (Thetford: Lowe 8c 
Brydon Printers, 1976), p. 46. 
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the end of all philosophy."29 On this score the romanticists 
proved to be true heirs of the Enlightenment and the classical 
liberal tradition. Where they parted company with their pred- 
ecessors was on the question of the relationship between indi- 
vidual freedom and society. For the philosophers of the En- 
lightenment and their revolutionary heirs, freedom was indig- 
enous, servitude was man-made; man came before society and 
made it possible through a social contract. Freedom was de- 
fined here as freedom from, as negative freedom or liberty 
that should be continuously guarded against the encroaching 
influence of authority, state, and society. The romanticists 
retained this preoccupation with freedom, but, after a brief 
period of enthusiasm about the French Revolution, they 
abandoned the premises oí jus naturae and embarked on a 
path toward a new theory, which stipulated that "a firm gov- 
ernment is indispensable to freedom."30 Brutal and often pat- 
ently random violence in the later years of the revolution (as 
exemplified in the September massacre of 1792) planted the 
seeds of doubt in the romantic mind as to the inherent ration- 
ality of reason. Liberated from external constraints and left to 
its own devices, reason showed irrational, if not downright 
suicidal, tendencies which were conspicuously at odds with the 
lofty assumptions of the philosophers of the Enlightenment. 
This traumatic experience compelled the revision of the lib- 
eral notion of freedom, which was defined as positive freedom 
or "freedom for" and proclaimed to be an end product rather 
than a starting point of human history. Equally radical was the 
change in outlook on the relevance of tradition. Caught be- 
tween the ancien régime they deemed obsolete and the new 
order they found inimical to freedom, the romanticists urned 
to a distant past. The medieval past of the romantic fancy had 
29 F. W. J. Schelling, Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795) (Leipzig: Verlag von 
Felix Meiner, 1911), p. 29. 30 G. W. F. Hegel, "The German Constitution" (1779-1802), in Hegel's Political 
Writings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 234. 
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little to do with the stagnant society in which the individual 
was permanently locked into his estate; this past was passé for 
those who believed that every man is entitled "to make oneself 
a member of one of the moments of civil society by one's own 
act, through one's energy, industry and skill,"31 that "no man 
whatever ought to be compelled to any particular class, nor 
shut from any."32 The past order which the romanticists came 
to praise and against which they learned to judge the present 
was both harmonious, or in the terminology of the epoch 
"organic," and at the same time perfectly conducive to indi- 
vidual freedom. No one is forced here to comply; everyone 
follows one's native genius; society remains forever malleable, 
though changes in it come not through the abrupt termination 
of tradition but through the gradual expansion of its confines. 
It is a permanent (r)evolution, accomplished through the con- 
tinuous self-rejuvenation of reason. 
One can readily see why these romantic musings appealed 
to the reactionary politicians in postrevolutionary Europe. No 
less apparent, however, is the liberating component of roman- 
ticism, which proved compatible with the socialist and liberal 
currents of nineteenth-century political discourse. The 
ideological perspective unifying nineteenth-century romanti- 
cism grows out of the romanticists' determination to realize 
radical objectives by conservative means. Romanticism was as 
much "a negation of the philistine substance and life style of 
the emerging bourgeoisie and a protest against the utilitarian 
ordering of life" as it was "a reaction against the backward 
feudal ideology and conditions of authoritarianism."33 The 
romanticists were "innovators and revolutionists" as well as 
"great restorers and wise conservatives."34 Their dialectical 
31 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1821) (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), p. 133. 
32 J. G. Fichte, "The Vocation of the Scholar" (1794), in The Popular Works of Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte (London: Trubner, 1889), 1: 179. 
33 Zipes, "Revolutionary Rise," p. 421. 34 Talmon, Romanticism, p. 136. 
This content downloaded from 131.216.164.152 on Tue, 16 Jul 2013 14:28:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SOCIOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS 89 
commitment o liberty and order is the broadest common 
denominator that unites otherwise diverse and openly an- 
tagonistic thinkers identified with the romantic movement. To 
be a romantic, we can say, is to believe that freedom can 
coexist with necessity, diversity with unity, arid self- 
determination with social order. Romantic philosophy, with its 
critical - hermeneutical - thrust, was an attempt to work out a 
theoretical foundation for the practical resolution of these 
antinomies. 
Romantic Philosophy and Hermeneutics 
Whitehead defined the romantic attitude as "a protest 
against the exclusion of value from the essence of matter of 
fact."35 This formula captures the gist of the romantic revolt 
against the dominant rationalist philosophy. Man, according to 
the rationalists, is handicapped in his quest for knowledge by 
innate as well as acquired biases, prejudices, or, in Bacon's 
terminology, "idols," which prevent the knower from seeing 
things as they really are in themselves. The process of under- 
standing can succeed only if the knower purges himself of 
preconceptions. The rational mind, urged Descartes, is active 
to the extent that is necessary to curtail its own unwanted 
interference with the preestablished order. The universal sci- 
ence of the future, as the rationalists envisioned it, called for 
faithful observance, not for participant observation; it stressed 
the activity of res extensa, not that of res cogitans. Once the mind 
fulfilled its purgative function, it was to assume its proper 
role, that is, to record faithfully the preordained movement of 
matter as it revealed itself to a disinterested scientific observer. 
It was this impersonal, mechanical universe that provoked the 
romantic revolt against rationalism and mechanism. The 
romanticists rejected the idea that knowledge can be freed 
35 Whitehead, Science, p. 115. 
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from the contaminating influence of the process of knowing. 
Scientific endeavor, according to them, is not a quest for 
things themselves and their primordial order; the scientific 
method is not an expedient way of getting around the distor- 
tions incurred by man's presence in the universe. Quite to the 
contrary, science's true aim is to humanize nature, to make it 
more rational; the scientist is a participant observer whose 
imprint on the outside world is irradicable and whose proper 
role is to restore man's responsibility for the world out there. 
The determination of mechanistic philosophy to do away with 
"idols" resulted in the dehumanization of the process of 
understanding. Along with human bias, the rationalists ex- 
cised the active side of knowing, reducing knowledge to pas- 
sive reflection. "The overcoming of all prejudices," contends 
Gadamer, "this global demand of the enlightenment, will 
prove to be itself a prejudice. . . ,"36 
Herein lies the significance of the revolution in philosophy 
initiated by Kant and continued by his romantic successors. 
The process of knowledge, for Kant, is selective, in that it 
chooses among many elements before it shapes them into an 
object. The selection is guided by our beliefs, preconceptions, 
values, and prejudices - literally prejudgments, without which 
cognition would be impossible. What it means is that ration- 
alists overlooked an irreducible lement of faith or value per- 
meating our knowledge. "I had therefore to remove knowl- 
edge," explains Kant, "in order to make room for belief."37 The 
secret of the transcendental judgment a priori - the heart of 
Kant's system - is that it is value judgment, that is, a judgment 
whose objective validity presupposes prior commitment o 
certain beliefs and values. The task of philosophical analysis, 
then, is not to expunge value from understanding and to 
eliminate all biases but to render them conscious, to turn them 
36 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1982), p. 244. 37 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781) (New York: Anchor, 1966), p. 
xxxix. 
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into premises. This is exactly the task of philosophical her- 
meneutics, the task of becoming reflexive, of uncovering prej- 
udices through which our understanding participates in the 
production of reality as objective and meaningful. When 
Goethe insists that every fact is already a theory; when Hegel 
exposes as self-deception the unreflexive mind's insistence on 
dealing with "bare facts"; when Emerson scolds reason that 
separates the fact from value; when Schlegel takes to task an 
empiricist for his unconscious reliance on a transcendental 
outlook - when all these giants of the romantic era raise their 
objections to unreflexive reasoning and urge the inescapability 
of prejudgments, they speak the language of hermeneutics. 
"This recognition that all understanding inevitably involves 
some prejudice gives the hermeneutical problem its real 
thrust."38 
Romantic hermeneutics, as one can gather from the above, 
is an extension of romantic philosophy. Dilthey takes note of 
this fact, pointing out that Schleiermacher "was specifically 
trained in transcendental philosophy which was the first to 
provide adequate means for stating the problem of her- 
meneutics in general terms and solving it."39 The principles of 
romantic hermeneutics - the constitutive nature of under- 
standing, the a priori foundation of knowledge, the unre- 
flexivity of consciousness, the dialectics of part and whole - 
belong to the general fund of ideas developed by romantic 
idealism. Transcendentalism furnished a new foundation for 
hermeneutics, moving it away from the traditional concern 
with the inherent properties of the text toward the examina- 
tion of the concealed interaction between the interpreter and 
his object. It helped to broaden the scope of the hermeneutical 
analysis by including in its orbit the entire range of cultural 
and natural objects, by treating all objective reality as a text 
38 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 239. 39 Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Writings (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 
258. 
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waiting to be interpreted. The old hermeneutics urged the 
interpreter unraveling the meaning of the past to free himself 
from the contaminating influence of the present; the romantic 
hermeneutics claimed that the past exists only through the 
present. The former insisted that the interpreter should ap- 
proach his task unbiased and presuppositionless; the latter 
assumed that bias is an unacknowledged premise, and all the 
knower can hope for is to turn his biases into acknowledged 
premises. Where one aimed outward, focusing the interpre- 
ter's undivided attention on the object, the other turned in- 
ward, postulating self-reflection as a precondition of successful 
interpretation. All understanding which is not dogmatic must 
begin with self-understanding. This romantic premise gives 
modern hermeneutics its peculiar flavor. It also points to a 
distinctly critical thrust of modern - romantic- hermeneutics. 
The Project of Sociological Hermeneutics 
Paul Ricouer once observed that we live "in a hermeneutical 
age,"40 by which he meant modern man's extraordinary 
preoccupation with self-reflection, démystification and crit- 
icism. The roots of this now-ubiquitous attitude can be traced 
to the romantic era or, if you will, to 1781, when Kant first 
proclaimed that "our age is, in every sense of the word, the 
age of criticism, and everything must submit to it."41 The same 
sentiment we find in the two generations of Kant's successors 
who declared a war on "dogmatism as a way of thinking,"42 on 
"the dogmatic tendency in man,"43 and demanded "a ruthless 
40 Paul Ricoeur, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), p. 221. 41 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. xxiv. 
42 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (1807) (New York: Harper 8c Row, 
1967), p. 99. 
43 J. G. Fichte, Science of Know/ edge (1794) (New York: Appleton, 1970), p. 161. 
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criticism of everything existing,"44 "a strenuous reacquisition of 
that which has once been acquired,"45 "putting to the test what 
has long since passed as established truth."46 Such were the 
opening salvos of the age of criticism, the hermeneutical age. 
Not surprisingly, this was also the dawning of the new era of 
democratic revolutions. It was the time when philosophical 
disquisitions were nourished by the flames of revolution, when 
self-reflection bred criticism and criticism inspired open insur- 
rection. The project of romantic hermeneutics was firmly 
rooted in the revolutionary transformations of the time and 
should be judged in their context. 
A great accomplishment of the French Revolution was the 
doubt it cast over the divine nature of the social order and 
man's place in it. In a dramatic fashion the revolution demon- 
strated that man's social qualities as well as the social order of 
which he finds himself a part are emergent. Whether it con- 
sists of slaves and masters, noblemen and commoners, 
capitalists and laborers, the social order is not ordained by 
God; nor are its members earmarked by nature for their 
stations in life; rather, individuals themselves generate their 
social order in the very process of knowing, by subsuming 
each other under a priori categories and forcing upon reality 
taken-for-granted nomenclatures. The institutions of society 
established in this manner only appear to be "noumenal," 
subsisting on their own; in truth, they are "phenomenal," that 
is, emergent, historical, contingent on the rational activities of 
its members. It is the mind that imposes structure on the 
world and assures its objective reality, and it is entirely in 
man's power to destroy his own creation, to supplant the old 
order with a new one. The realization that mind is a constitu- 
tive force was itself an offshoot of the revolutionary era: 
44 Karl Marx, "Letter to Arnold Ruge, September 1843," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., 
The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 8. 
45 F. W. J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) (Charlottesville: Univer- 
sity of Virginia Press, 1978), p. 1. 
46 S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) (Princeton: Princeton Uni- 
versity Press, 1941), p. 35. 
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That was an age of great destructions. When the Revolution 
came, many institutions which long seemed to be things in 
themselves, showed that they were nothing but phenomena. 
And when new constitutions and new social orders had to be 
planned, the spirit of the age emphasized the fact that, at least 
in the social world, it is the office of human intelligence to 
impose its own forms upon the phenomena, and to accept no 
authority but that of the rational self.47 
The critical mode of thinking engendered in romantic social 
thought predicates that society owes its objective reality to con- 
sciousness. A fine-spun network of a priori assumptions and 
categories, according to this premise, serves as a ground plan in 
terms of which the understanding generates the social world. 
The understanding does its job without being aware of its 
awesome accomplishment - it is perennially unreflexive, yet 
this unreflexivity is the very stuff of which social facts are 
made. Social reality presents itself to the mind as a noumenon, 
an object unrelated to the subject or a "bare fact," yet this 
facticity is apparent: social facts and the social orders they 
comprise are brought into being by the work of our under- 
standing. The paradox of the social world is that the society 
confronting us in all its glorious externality and unyielding 
thinghood is the work of our (un)conscious activity. The whole 
edifice of social institutions rests on the exceedingly shaky 
foundation of transcendental beliefs and values. "Ultimately 
everything rests on a postulate," intones Kierkegaard,48 even if 
this postulate remains incomprehensible to the subject. An 
element of incomprehensibility, opaqueness, and unreflexivity 
is at the core of social being - expose it, and the whole order 
will collapse: 
But is incomprehensibility really something so unmitigatedly 
contemptible and evil? Methink the salvation of families and 
47Josiah Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1919), p. 65. 48 S. Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 
45 
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nations rests upon it. If I am not wholly deceived, then states 
and systems, the most artificial productions of man, are often so 
artificial that one simply can't admire the wisdom of their 
creator enough. Only an incredibly minute quantity of it suf- 
fices: as long as its truth and purity remain inviolate and no 
blasphemous rationality dares approach its sacred confines. . . 
[Every system] depends in the last analysis ... on some such 
point of strength that must be left in the dark, but that 
nonetheless shores up and supports the whole burden and 
would crumble the moment one subjected it to rational 
analysis.49 
It should be clear by now that social institutions are not 
immune to hermeneutical analysis, that social facts are per- 
fectly amenable to the interpretative understanding. More- 
over, it is quite plausible, as Rickert argued decades ago,50 
that the romantic idealists derived their general prob- 
lematics chiefly from the social domain, on which they mod- 
eled their treatment of nature. Transcendentalism was in- 
spired by the travails of the revolutionary age in which the 
task of recapturing one's authorship first emerged as a practi- 
cal problem. Dogmatism or the unreflexive mode of being in 
the world decried by the romantic thinkers is coterminal with 
the institutions of the ancien régime, which, toward the end of 
the nineteenth century, ceased to be perceived as natural and 
inherently rational and were increasingly subjected to critical 
debunking by the subjects rediscovering the constitutive power 
of reason. "Thing-in-itself" is a philosophical epitome of the 
world in which the individual is no longer at home, where he 
is not a master of himself but an exile, condemned to inau- 
thentic existence by his own unreflexivity. He is surrounded 
by social facts - customs, institutions, estates, each weighing 
heavily on his consciousness, demanding unequivocal respect, 
threatening to subdue anyone who dares to question their 
authenticity. Alas, this unhappy state of affairs is itself the 
49 Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegels Lucinde, p. 268. 
50 Heinnck Rickert, Science and History: A Critique of Positivist Epistemology (1902) 
(New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962), p. 102. 
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work of the mind unconscious of its agency. To break the 
mold of pseudofacticity in which the institutions present 
themselves to the mind, the latter must become self-reflexive. 
When the understanding becomes transparent to itself and 
acquires a hermeneutical insight into its role as a participant 
observer in the order of things, social facts lose their impene- 
trability and submit to rational change. 
The project of sociological hermeneutics i thus fundamen- 
tally that of rediscovery and emancipation - rediscovery of 
authorship and emancipation from the oppressive weight of 
obsolete institutions. The first impetus to this project came 
from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and the French Declaration 
of Rights of Man and Citizen. We find an unmistakable im- 
print of these two pillars of modernity in Schelling's attacks on 
dogmatism and Fichte's belief in the primacy of self- 
determination; in the contempt for philistinism and compla- 
cency professed by Novalis, Schlegel, and Tieck; in the cri- 
tique of alienation by Hegel, Feuerbach, Stirner, and Marx; as 
well as in the transvaluation of values attempted by Nietzsche 
at the close of the romantic era. When Marx announced that 
"self-understanding (equals critical philosophy) by our age . . . 
is a task for the world" and promised to reform society 
"through the analysis of mystical consciousness that is not clear 
to itself,"51 he did not break new ground - he simply stated in 
explicitly sociological terms the mission of romantic her- 
meneutics. Marx's iconoclastic attitude is characteristic of the 
second generation of romantic thinkers, who were determined 
to put "the searching knife of criticism" to every institution of 
yesteryear. Their diction, expressly political and self- 
consciously defiant, differed markedly from the studiously 
metaphysical language of their romantic predecessors, but 
their message remained essentially the same: man is an author 
of the historical drama responsible for his social world and 
51 Kark Marx, "A Correspondence of 1843," in Karl Marx: Early Texts (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1972), p. 82. 
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capable of reclaiming authority over his creations through the 
systematic exercise of self-reflection. 
The Dialectic of Rationality and Sociality 
The enthusiasm with which the romanticists greeted the 
breakdown of the old regime, intense and sincere as it was in 
the opening days of the revolution, faded rapidly as the news 
about the increasingly bloody course of events in Paris spread 
throughout Europe. And when the measured staccato of the 
guillotines heralded to the world the arrival of the Terror, 
most of the early supporters of the revolution turned against 
it, feeling betrayed and loudly denouncing the dangerous 
shortcut to freedom taken by the French. Something went 
terribly wrong with the way the heirs of the Enlightenment set 
out to reclaim the natural rights of man. The dawn of the 
Age of Reason was marred by exemplary irrationality and 
seemingly random violence which made a mockery of the 
optimistic forecasts of the prophets of the Enlightenment. 
Freed from the restraints of society, reason looked nothing 
like the benign and constructive force in the service of natural 
law it was hailed to be; instead, it showed itself to be arrogant, 
vindictive, and utterly self-destructive. In the wake of the 
Terror the veracity of a theory that pictured society as deriva- 
tive and incidental to the affairs of reason was suspect. 
Toward the end of the century it came under close scrutiny by 
the romantic thinkers, who gave a decidedly new - sociologi- 
cal - turn to the traditional discourse on the nature of reason. 
According to the rationalist mode of thinking, reason pre- 
cedes society and needs no help from it to do the job it was 
entrusted with by the Almighty. Society contaminates reason 
with prejudices - idols - which only muddle the picture of the 
preestablished harmony. To fulfill its mission, reason must 
break through the veils of society and open itself to the natu- 
ral purity of things themselves and their primordial order. By 
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contrast, the romanticists conceived of reason as socially em- 
bedded and historically emergent. Consciousness is permeated 
with prejudices and a priori assumptions, but it is only because 
it is so informed and guided by society that it is the conscious- 
ness of man. Humans act consciously and rationally when they 
raise themselves above their immediate existence, place them- 
selves in the perspective of the community, and, armed with a 
priori categories and values, transform the flux of things 
themselves into an orderly flow of objective reality. Sociality is 
implicit in every rational act. "Gemeinschaft, pluralism is our 
innermost essence,"52 exclaims Schlegel; what this means is 
that only those forces in man are truly rational that are medi- 
ated by the community. Rationality without sociality, mind 
outside of the human community, is unthinkable. 
Already in Kant we find a hint that reason may be social, at 
least in form if not in substance. The transcendental domain 
contains cognitive constructs which have no existence apart 
from the individual mind but which nevertheless transcend 
personal experience and claim universal validity. Drawing on 
these transcendental schemes of understanding, the subject 
can induce objectivity into things without visible recourse to 
any authority beyond himself, yet each time he raises the claim 
that the reality in question is objective and meaningful, he 
presupposes, however tacitly, that it is universally - 
intersubjectively - valid. When man hazards a universal judg- 
ment, "he disregards the subjective private conditions of his 
own judgment . . . and reflects upon it from a universal 
standpoint (which he can only determine by placing himself at 
the standpoint of others)."53 Kant would not say of course 
that a priori categories of reason come from society and 
change with time (he obviously thought these to be innate and 
52 Quoted in Kluckhohn, Persönlichkeit und Gemeinschaft: Studien zur Staats Auffassung 
der Deutschen Romantik (Halle/Saale: M. Niemeyer Verlag, 1925), p. 5. 
53 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (1790) (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1951), p. 
137. 
This content downloaded from 131.216.164.152 on Tue, 16 Jul 2013 14:28:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SOCIOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS 99 
unalterable), but the very fact that they possess a power tran- 
scending individual experience and binding on every rational 
member of the community invites a sociological interpretation. 
With Kant's romantic followers the social and historical na- 
ture of reason is already a matter of unshakable conviction. 
Reason evolves historically, along with the human community, 
and embodies the collective forces of society, even though its 
immediate expression is individual. The transcendental power 
of mind, the power to convert things in themselves into ob- 
jects, is social in form and content. Beyond the transcendental 
judgment a priori stands a community (real or potential) 
which delegates its authority to its members and gives them 
confidence to treat the reality in question as objective and 
meaningful. Every thought, precept, or deed that passes the 
test of rationality has its beginning and end in society. Even 
the most intimate notion of self, according to romantic 
thinkers, is of social origins: "The self perceives itself at the 
same time that it is perceived by others. . . Self-consciousness 
exists in itself and for itself ... by the very fact that it exists for 
another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being 
acknowledged or recognized."54 "Only by meeting with, so as 
to be resisted by, Another, does the Soul become a Self. What is 
Self-consciousness but to know myself at the same moment 
that I know another, and to know myself by means of knowing 
another, and vice versa."55 
It would be wrong to infer from the above that, while 
reason needs society to perform its function, society endures 
on its own, independently from individual minds. Each society 
has an enormous stake in cultivating its members' rational 
faculties - suppress them, and it withers away along with the 
reasoning powers of individuals. Society is a perpetually re- 
newed community of minds accomplished through the ra- 
54 Hegel, Phenomenology, pp. 661, 229. 55 S. T. Coleridge, quoted in K. Coburn, The S elf -Conscious Imagination (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 32. 
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tional activities of individuals. The thesis of the inherent so- 
ciality of reason, consequently, requires a dialectical inversion: 
just as reason is social through and through, so is society 
permeated with reason. The individual is a responsible 
member of society to the extent that he acts rationally, and 
society is an objective and meaningful whole as long as its 
members share rationales for action. External and petrified as 
the social order may seem, it remains a product of ongoing 
rationalization at every moment of its existence. In the lan- 
guage of philosophical hermeneutics this proposition reads as 
follows: "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.1156 
In the sociological parlance it can be stated this way: "Activity 
and mind, both in their content and in their mode of existence, 
are social: social activity and social mind."57 Rendered freely, 
this means that society persists as long as it is projected into 
the meaningful actions of its members and ceases to exist as an 
objective whole when individuals deny its inherent rationality 
and refuse to abide by the a priori schemes of understanding 
in which it has been traditionally cast. 
There is a body of opinion, both popular and scholarly, that 
depicts romantics as narcissistic, oblivious to the problems of 
community at large, antisocial in their basic impulses. This 
view is hopelessly one-sided. Much closer to the truth, I think, 
are those commentators who contend that "the longing for 
community is one of the most important themes in Romanti- 
cism,"58 that "in every definite sense we can speak of this 
philosophy ... as one which is social in its character."59 True, 
the romanticists are preoccupied with self-reflection a d place 
an inordinate emphasis on subjectivity, but this romantic on- 
cern does not imply an a-social bias; if anything, it is due to 
the romanticists' acute sense of responsibility for the fate of 
56 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 10. 
57 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York: International 
Publishers, 1964), p. 138. 58 H. Staten, "Newman on Self and Society," Studies in Romanticism 18 (iy/y): by. 
59 Mead, Movements of Thought, p. 147. 
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the community and reflects their belief that the actions of the 
individual count. This goes not only for the champions of 
public causes such as Fichte, Hegel, and Marx, but also for the 
"archindividualists" like F. Schlegel, Kierkegaard, and Emer- 
son. Even Max Stirner, the prophet of modern egoism, re- 
serves his most eloquent rhetoric for the description of 
"union" - the future community of free spiritual beings. Con- 
cern for society is embedded in the romantic frame of mind. 
What is different about the romanticists' treatment of society 
and reason is the radical manner in which they welded the 
two into one continuum. The romanticists found the seeds of 
society at the nub of consciousness and discerned the imprint 
of reason on the fabric of the social order. They discovered a 
new domain (they called it "transcendental") where reason and 
society meet, becoming one, a realm of what we now call 
values, the locus of which is intraindividual but the substance 
of which is extraindividual and intersubjective. This is a 
paradoxical realm comprising all those prelogical and largely 
taken-for-granted categories in terms of which we make sense 
of the world and which tie us together into a community. 
Through this domain society enters the individual, leaving a 
deposit of rationality that makes man truly human. Both rea- 
son and society appear to be sui generis, yet neither can exist 
by itself, and each is inexorably tied to its other. The two grow 
together, sometimes locked in bitter dispute, sometimes peace- 
fully coexistent, always mutually constitutive. This reasoning 
was a methodological expression of the romanticists' political 
ambivalence, of their desire to mediate between the conserva- 
tive thesis and the radical antithesis. "Dialectical" and "media- 
tory" are virtually synonymous in romantic idealism. 
The whole approach can be seen as a deft attempt to 
safeguard the emancipatory legacy of the French Revolution 
from its violent excesses by substituting hermeneutical 
philosophy for the shallow contractarianism ofthe Enlighten- 
ment. Rejecting the political ideology of the Left, the romanti- 
cists contended that human society is not a mechanical aggre- 
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gate of individuals but an organic whole, the members of 
which are bound together by a continuous thread of tradition, 
a way of thinking and feeling that is ingrained in every mind 
and that cannot be dislodged by revolutionary decrees. At the 
same time, they shunned the reactionary ideologies and urged 
the inevitability of social change, thereby serving notice on the 
ideologists of the old regime that the traditional ways of doing 
things cannot be petrified by repressive measures any more 
than they can be legislated by the overzealous guardians of 
natural rights. An offshoot of this dual political agenda was 
their hermeneutically grounded social theory with its dialecti- 
cal, mediatory stance and a characteristic emphasis on the 
organic nature of the relationship between reason and society, 
liberty and order, tradition and social change. 
Romantic Organicism and the Hermeneutical Circle 
In the Occidental tradition, society was often compared to 
an organism and treated as a whole which, as the saying goes, 
is always more than the sum of its parts. To be sure, the will of 
the individual was instrumental in setting society in motion, 
but once established, it was to persist as a collective body 
charged with ultimate power to coerce its members in the 
interests of the whole. From Plato to Aristotle, through Au- 
gustine and Aquinas, to Hobbes and Saint-Simon, this 
metaphor provided a guiding light to theorists searching for 
an ideal of social peace and harmony. The message it con- 
veyed was a simple one: there will be no peace and harmony 
until individuals are subordinated to society, as parts of an 
organism are subordinated to the whole. A healthy society, as 
seen in this perspective, is the one that is insulated from the 
wills of its individual members. 
The image of organic society we find in romantic literature 
is of a strikingly different nature. The individual is cast here 
not only as an actor but also as an author; he is a self-conscious 
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and critical being endowed with a right - and duty - to judge 
for himself matters of state. A healthy society is not the one 
where the will of the individual is subordinated to the will of 
society but where the will of the whole coincides with the will 
of the individual. The whole is more than the sum of its parts, 
romanticists concede, but it is also less than any of its individ- 
ual members. For the human individual is a social being, "he 
belongs to more than one world . . . traverses many systems 
and encircles many a sun."60 He is "the living species," the 
knower and the subject who "treats himself as a universal and 
therefore free being";61 "to him his species, his essential na- 
ture, and not merely his individuality, is an object of 
thought."62 To cast him as a part indifferent to the whole is 
therefore to deprive the individual of his true dignity. The 
organic analogy thus loses much of its customary biological 
connotation, becoming more akin to the metaphor of the 
micro- and macrocosm: "The individual ives in the whole, the 
whole in the individual. . . Society is nothing but social life: 
an invisible, thinking, and feeling person. Each man is a small 
society."63 "Man is no abstract being squatting outside the 
world. Man is the world of man, the state, society. . . . Man, 
much as he may therefore be a particular individual, . . . is just 
as much a totality - the ideal society - the subjective existence of 
thought and experienced society for itself."64 
The thing that strikes one most about these credal state- 
ments of romantic organicism is their circular character: the 
whole is looked at here through the prism of its parts, while 
the properties of the part are explicated through the whole. 
60 F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Schleier mâcher' s Soliloquies (1800) (Chicago: Open Court, 
1957), p. 47. 
61 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, p. 112. 62 P. J. A. von Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841) (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1957), p. 2. 
63 Novalis, Schriften: Das Philosophische Werke (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 
1960), p. 66. 
ö* Karl Marx, Critique oj Hegeis Philosophy of Right (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press, 1967), p. 131; Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, p. 138. 
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The circle involved in this reasoning is neither vicious nor 
unintended. It can be understood as a special case of what 
Schelling called "the circle of knowledge," or what is now 
better known under the name popularized by Schleiermacher 
as "the hermeneutical circle." The term refers to a circular 
path the mind is forced to travel in pursuit of meaning. Thus 
the exact sense of a word becomes clear to an interpreter 
through its context, the meaning of a sentence through the 
whole text; the text is understood when the author's intent 
and a priori assumptions are known, which, in turn, presup- 
poses knowledge of the cultural tradition that shaped the 
author's imagination. 
To comprehend the total cultural context, we have to travel 
in the opposite direction, starting with the larger whole and 
making our way to the individual parts. The understanding en 
route to full knowledge therefore travels in circles: "Complete 
knowledge always involves an apparent circle that each part 
can be understood only out of the whole to which it belongs, 
and vice versa. All knowledge that is scientific must be con- 
structed in this way."65 Schleiermacher did not explore the 
implications of this principle for the study of society; nor did 
his sociologically minded contemporaries draw on his her- 
meneutical writings. Still, we can say with confidence that 
Schleiermacher's theory of the hermeneutical circle and 
romantic sociology share a common heritage of transcendental 
idealsm and help appreciably to illuminate each other. The 
principle of the hermeneutical circle, Schleiermacher con- 
tends, covers all forms of intercourse, past and present, where 
people make sense, exchange meaning, and produce order 
out of seemingly incongruous individual acts. Social inter- 
course, as seen in this perspective, is the hermeneutical pro- 
cess whereby individuals produce a sense of the whole and 
establish the universe of meaning intelligible to every partici- 
pant. 
65 F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts (1805-33) 
(Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977), p. 42. 
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By the same token, society is a universe of discourse. The 
term "universe" (literally, one verse) favored by the romantic 
thinkers is very indicative in this respect: it hints at the Logos, 
the Word that unites disparate individuals into a social whole. 
To be grasped hermeneutically, this whole must be "lived 
through [erlebt] and not just apprehended and explained [erkannt 
und erlernt]11; it must be studied by the knower with "a feeling 
for value and meaning."66 The hermeneutical scholar appro- 
priates as his own the universe of meaning generated by 
others. He learns to discern the meaningful actions of individ- 
uals behind the most rigid institutions of the state. Cut down 
to size by his interpretative gaze, the state will no longer awe 
him with its Leviathanic vastness; rather, he will see it as a 
living reality. Society will unfold before his eyes as a process of 
articulation in the course of which individuals grasp their 
identities as members of the same universe of meaning. The 
successive generations of individuals partake in this process, 
bound by a common heritage of language and meaning, yet 
never failing to leave a mark on it. While they continue to rely 
on customary terms and apply time-honored nomenclatures, 
society persists as a pattern or structure with all the appear- 
ance of an eternal thing-in-itself. This is just an appearance, 
however. Society's customary being is routine, not extem- 
poraneous; it is perpetuated by the participants who are not 
bound irrevocably to the terms of their discourse. New 
nomenclatures are devised and brought to bear on the famil- 
iar situations, assuring the flow of change. What this means is 
that "just as society produces man as man, so is society produced 
by him."67 
If there is a single ideological imperative underlying the 
circular mold of romantic thought, it is the determination to 
place the individual and society on equal footing. Behind the 
BB Adam H. Müller, Die Elemente der Staatskunst (1809) (Jena: Verlag von Gustav 
Fischer, 1922), p. 16. 
h< Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, p. lô/. 
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organic imagery of romantic social theory one senses the 
craving for freedom qualified by responsibility, the longing 
for continuity punctuated by change. Man-the-microcosm, the 
part coequal to the whole, the species being - this unmistaka- 
bly romantic terminology has all the markings of the post- 
revolutionary era. It reflects the sentiment of those who reject 
the revolutionary and the reactionary alike. The language of 
romanticism confers on the individual a crushing responsibility 
for the well-being of the whole society. At the same time, it 
stipulates that man's liberty is contingent on his ability to 
embrace the whole, to incorporate its ways into his self. In 
choosing this language, the romanticists consciously break with 
the classical dichotomy of the individual and society, for which 
they substitute a dialectical view that posits the two as thesis 
and antithesis, as aspects of the same process of the produc- 
tion of social reality. The species being celebrated by the 
romanticists is a conscious being, willingly submitting to the 
necessity of law, not because this law is ordained and en- 
forced by an external authority but because it stands to reason. 
A sovereign and citizen at the same time, he is, above all, a 
self, a subjective being of society conscious of itself: "The 
Romantic philosophy pointed out that the self, while it arises 
in the social experience, also carries with it the very unity that 
makes society possible, . . . that society is nothing but an orga- 
nization of selves."68 
Gemeinschaft as an Ideal of Free Discourse 
The image of Gemeinschaft formed in many a head by the 
prolific literature on the subject is that of a community of 
individuals bound together by personal, emotional ties, going 
leisurely about the business of life, insulated from the hustle 
and bustle of industrial civilization, and generally antithetical 
68 Mead, Movements of Thought, pp. 125, 101. 
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to the spirit of modernity. The impression of an antimodernist 
bias is exacerbated by the medieval symbolism that crops up in 
the rhetoric of Gemeinschaft. Contrasted to the latter is the 
image of an impersonal, money-bound, legalistic Gesellschaft 
symbolizing the modern way of life. The final conclusion 
seems inevitable: one is dealing with a solidly conservative 
idea, masquerading as a historical description but intended 
chiefly as ideological ammunition against the forces of moder- 
nity and social change. This common view, much of which 
originates in neoromantic literature, does not withstand a 
critical examination. 
That the romanticists spoke in hostile terms about the age oí 
the machine, despised utilitarianism, and scorned bourgeois 
philistinism goes without saying. It is also true that they 
praised the virtues of medieval culture and bemoaned the 
passing of the organic state. It is emphatically not true that the 
romanticists entertained serious hopes for the revival of 
medieval institutions, or that they rejected modernity as such. 
The romantic notion of Gemeinschaft was an explicitly norma- 
tive construct whose critical edge was directed against the 
reified conditions of modern life. The unfolding of bourgeois 
society accorded ill with romantic ideals, and as the gulf be- 
tween these ideals and bureaucratic realities widened, the 
romanticists did not hesitate to denounce what they perceived 
to be a perversion of social intercourse. The romantic idealists 
longed for a social order that would be neither bourgeois nor 
feudal. Their views were anticapitalist, insofar as the 
capitalism of the time was synonymous with the degradation 
of human conditions, but they were also antiauthoritarian d 
therefore inimical to the spirit of the Middle Ages. Their 
mistrust of industrialism and capitalism did not blind them to 
the emancipatory potential of the machine. And their con- 
tempt for bourgeois philistinism was more than offset by their 
deep respect for the freedoms of conscience and religion that 
were bourgeois to the core. Call them Utopian or idealistic if 
you will, but not reactionary. Even the label "conservative" 
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does not fully apply to the proponents of Gemeinschaft, whose 
commitment to the ideal of free discourse was nothing short 
of revolutionary, and whose main target - bureaucratic 
ossification - was as sure a sign of modernity as there could be. 
The reification of the state was the main target of the 
romantic critique in the 1830s and 1840s. So strong was the 
antistate sentiment in this period that it is sometimes taken as 
a sign of a break between the first and second generations of 
romanticists. The split, however, is largely apparent. All 
romanticists were propelled by the same longing for an or- 
ganic relation between man and society. The romanticists of 
the 1840s turned against the state only after their hopes for its 
imminent transformation into an organic whole were dashed. 
The iconoclastic attitude toward the state and bureaucracy was 
already evident in early romantics who lived long enough to 
witness the distortion of their ideals in the Napoleonic and 
Prussian states. As early as 1823 Schlegel lamented that the 
modern state resembles "an all-directing and all-ruling law 
machine - and decree factory - whose sovereign power should 
subjugate all things divine and human. . . ."69 An echo of these 
jeremiads can be heard in Marx's attack on "the spirit of 
bureaucracy" permeating modern society, Stirner's philippics 
against the state as a "true personality" more real than the 
individual, as well as in the antistatist declarations of Emerson. 
The target of this criticism was not so much the state as the 
stifling effect of the bureaucratic social order on the individ- 
ual. A specimen, a member of a class, modern man seemed to 
the romanticists of the second generation a bitter caricature of 
the image of "the living species" they cherished so much: "The 
individuals have only the value of specimens of the same 
species or genus; . . . what you are ... as a unique person must 
be - suppressed."70 "The individuals of a class [exist] only as 
69 Quoted in H. G. Schenk, "Leviathan and the European Romantics," Cambridge 
Journal 1 (1948): 247. 70 Max Stirner, The Ego and His Own (1845) (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 
215. 
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average individuals, only in so far as they lived within the 
conditions of existence of their class - a relationship in which 
they participate not as individuals but as members of a class."71 
"Our age has forsaken the individuals. . . . There are no 
more individuals but only specimens. . . . Man's kinship with 
deity [is forgotten]."72 
Underlying all these lamentations is a theme that has be- 
come closely associated with romantic thought - the theme of 
alienation and reification. Reification is a pathological symp- 
tom of the modern age, a state in which society appears to its 
members as a noumenon, an external and coercive entity, and 
not as a living whole responsive to its members' needs and 
wishes. The state confronts one here as an omnipotent being 
to be revered, obeyed, and feared by mere mortals. In these 
reified conditions, free discourse is greatly impeded: it grows 
compulsive, is marred by deep enmity between the partici- 
pants, and is subject to frequent breakdowns. The individual is 
forced to take part in this discourse against his will, producing 
sense that makes little sense to him personally, generating a 
reality he experiences as a threat. Alienated from his universal 
essence, he is reduced to a cog in a superhuman machine. 
Life, reason, power - everything that belongs to the 
individual - is delegated to this lifeless automaton that hovers 
in the Platonic realm of everlasting beings, exhorting men to 
selfless efforts on its behalf. The root of the modern predica- 
ment, as romanticists saw it, is reason's unreflexivity, the fact 
that "we first share the life by which things exist and after- 
wards see them as appearances in nature and forget that we 
have shared their causes."73 The weight of social facts, mag- 
nified by the power of tradition, prevents the individual from 
seeing his own imprint on the way things are. To challenge the 
71 Kark Marx, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 
75. 
72 Sjziren Kierkegaard, The Point of View of My Work as an Author: A Report to History 
(1848) (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 111. 
7} R. W. Emerson, Emerson's Essays (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1961), p. 46. 
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reality of social facts, he would have to question the rationality 
and good judgment of other beings with whom he partakes in 
the same social intercourse. The wider the social discourse and 
the community of assumptions behind it, the more thinglike 
the social reality, and the greater the fear of committing lapsus 
judicii. No wonder "mankind is shy of self-analysis, and many 
people tremble slavishly when they can no longer dodge the 
question . . . what they have become, and who they really 
are. . . . The spell of life and of the world is upon them."74 
It is against the backdrop of this heartless world that we 
should judge the ideal of an organic community, whose roots 
the romanticists sought in the past but whose full realization 
they tied to the future. The term Gemeinschaft had not yet 
acquired its common meaning, but the vision of a harmonious 
community it had come to signify was already in place. Fichte 
called it "the universal commonwealth," Schleiermacher "the 
community of free spiritual beings," Müller "an organic state," 
Marx "communism," Stirner "union," Thoreau "perfect and 
glorious state," Emerson "a nation of men unanimously bent 
on freedom." Differing in a number of important respects, the 
authors of these projects agreed on one key point: the society 
of the future should be a universal community, an ever- 
expanding universe of discourse that existed for its own sake, 
excluded no one, and drew every human being in its orbit. 
The foundation of this social order would not be the social 
contract of the philosophes "but an ever-originating Social Con- 
tract," an alliance that is "perpetually and at every moment 
renewed and thereby reestablished through new freedoms 
that spring to life along the old ones."75 "It is not another 
State . . . that men aim at, but their Union, this ever-fluid 
uniting of everything standing . . . intercourse orunion."76 The 
new social order creates "the real basis for rendering it impos- 
74 Schleiermacher, Soliloquies, p. 26. '° Coleridge, in Kathleen Coburn, Inquiring òpint (loronto: University or 1 oronto 
Press), p. 316 and Müller, Elemente, p. 147. 76 Stirner, Ego, pp. 138, 212. 
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sible that anything should exist independently of individuals, 
in so far as things are only a product of the preceding inter- 
course of individuals themselves."77 
How can this ideal be realized? A basic premise of romantic 
hermeneu tics - reason is social, society is rational - already 
suggests an answer: If it is true that reified social institutions 
are "thoughts [that] had become corporeal on their own ac- 
count," that the state is "a fixed idea . . . that has subjected 
man to itself,"78 then to bring down ossified social reality 
reason must recognize its involvement in the objectivity of the 
social world - it must become self-reflexive. The knower con- 
quers the Leviathan of the state when he appropriates social 
reality as his own and refuses to identify with it. The species 
being, a subjective being of society conscious of itself, man 
only needs to alter his self-consciousness to bring about 
changes in society: "The idols exist through me; I need only 
refrain from creating them anew, then they exist no longer."79 
The foremost ask of the day is "self-examination: becoming 
conscious of oneself, not as individuals but as mankind."80 
This task of critical self-reflection is first accomplished by a 
great man. A seer, a prophet, a rebel - a great man is always 
an individual who manages before others to break the spell of 
oppressive social reality. What distinguishes him from other 
disaffected individuals is his ability to penetrate the sacred 
domain of the transcendental  priori, to cast shadow on the 
taken-for-granted rationality of a tradition, to effect the 
"Transvaluation of All Values."81 The romantic hero is a vir- 
tuoso of self-reflection a d self-transcendence; he does not 
merely forecast he future, he casts the future by recasting old 
schemes of thought and broadcasting the new ones. Single- 
77 Marx, German Ideology, p. 70. 
78 Stirner, Ego, pp. 237, 59. 
79 Ibid., p. 223. 
011 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (1901) (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 
316. 
81 Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Genealogy of Morals," in The Birth of Tragedy and The 
Genealogy of Morals (1887) (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 296. 
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handedly he can supply the verses for the future universe of 
discourse. "The given actuality has completely lost its validity 
[for him]; it has become for him an imperfect form which 
everywhere constrains. . . . [He] has advanced beyond the 
reach of his age and opened a front against it."82 His task, 
however, is not fully accomplished until he is joined by others, 
that is, until the awakening from the dogmatic slumber 
spreads through society. That is when self-reflection a d self- 
change translate into revolutionary change, when "the coinci- 
dence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity 
or self-changing [transpires] as revolutionary practice."** A 
genuine revolution is a crisis of objectivity on a mass scale, a 
practical accomplishment of an army of alienated human be- 
ings refusing to subsume themselves under the customary 
classifications and to lend their faces to dramatizing the 
familiar social reality as objective and meaningful. Revo- 
lutionary labor denaturalizes the social order, converting 
things in themselves back into concrete historical phenomena. 
And it accomplishes this feat not through physical force but 
through the power of reason. 
It is striking how thoroughly convinced the romantic 
idealists were in the peaceful nature of their endeavor. The 
most hot-headed of them were at pains to emphasize the 
peaceful character of their revolution. The radical 
transformation of society, insisted Marx while he was still 
under the sway of romantic idealism, involves nothing else but 
the 
reform of consciousness, [which] consists solely in letting the 
world perceive its own consciousness by awakening it from 
dreaming about itself, in explaining to it its own actions. . . . 
Reform of consciousness . . . through analysis of mystical con- 
sciousness that is not clear to itself. . . . Self-understanding ... is 
the task for the world and for us. What is at stake is a confes- 
82 Sjzfren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony (1841) (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1965), p. 278. 
8:J Marx, German Ideology, p. 198. 
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sion, nothing more. To get its sins forgiven, humanity only 
needs to describe them as they are.84 
Just that - the confession and the reform of conscious- 
ness - and the whole of society will be transformed, as if 
by magic, into something more rational and infinitely more 
humane. Thoreau and Emerson could not agree more. "Peace- 
able revolution" is the term Thoreau aptly used to describe 
the revolt of reason against a society that had become im- 
pervious to the wishes of its members ("civil disobedience" is 
its other, more familiar name): "In fact, I quietly declare war 
with the state, after my fashion. .. I simply wish to refuse 
allegiance to the state, to withdraw and stand aloof from it 
effectually."85 In the language of Emerson, one should be a 
"nonconformist" in order to effect social change, that is, one 
must stop "conforming to usages that have become dead to 
you" and playing the "game of conformity."86 For Kier- 
kegaard, revolution is also chiefly an affair of the mind; it is 
begun by an ironist, a master of self-transcendence, who en- 
deavors to throw off "the weight of objectivity" and destroy 
"the actuality he hostilely opposes"; his role is "prophetic, . . . 
for he constantly points to something future," but he cannot 
achieve his task of tearing down the obsolete actuality alone; 
this is the task for a people.87 Of all the romantics, Stirner 
takes the most radical scalpel to the reified social institutions, 
vowing to destroy "fixed ideas" whatever form they take - 
"people," "party," society" itself; but radical as his ends are, 
they can still be achieved by the same "peaceable" means of 
self-awakening and self-transcendence: '"Higher powers' exist 
only through my exalting them and abasing myself. . . . All 
84 Marx, "A Correspondence of 1843," p. 81. 85 Henri Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience" (1847), in The Portable Thoreau (New York: 
Viking Press, 1947), pp. 123, 131. 86 Emerson, Essays, pp. 35, 2-3. 87 Kierkegaard, Concluding, p. 62; Concept of Irony, p. 278. 
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slaves become free men as soon as they no longer respect their 
master as master."88 
With all their iconoclasm and extremism, spurred by the 
upsurge of public discontent in the 1830s and 1840s, the late 
romantic thinkers remained true to the spirit of idealism, 
sharing their predecessors' belief in the constitutive power of 
reason, man's potential for self-renewal, and the possibility of 
evolutionary change. Behind their rhetoric we find the same 
abhorrence of revolutionary violence and desire to transform 
the world peacefully that informed the political sensibilities of 
early romantics who suffered the trauma of the Terror. The 
image of "true Gemeinschaft" was a guiding light in the roman- 
ticists' quest for a society that makes violence and compulsion 
obsolete in all its forms, and it is this quest that led them to 
rediscover the value of tradition and social order. Far from 
being an expression of the reactionary ideology of the forces 
defeated in the French Revolution and marching crabwise into 
the future, the notion of Gemeinschaft was an attempt at cre- 
ative reappraisal of the past with an eye to securing the eman- 
cipatory goals of the future. These goals, reflecting the 
romanticists' unshakable conviction in the dignity of man, 
were as modern as the means of furthering them were peace- 
ful and idealistic. All reason had to do to secure its ends was to 
realize its constitutive power and break the veil of facticity 
surrounding obsolete social institutions. The battle for the 
community of the future had to be fought and won not on the 
barricades but in the minds of individuals - it was to be a battle 
of reason against itself, "the battle of reason ... to break the 
rigidity to which understanding has reduced everything."89 
The romantic quest for an organic community brings into 
clear relief what Ricoeur calls the "double edge" of her- 
meneutics: its penchant for suspicion and its longing for cer- 
88 Stirner, Ego, pp. 223, 168. 
89 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Logic: Being Part of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences (1817) (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 53. 
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titude.90 It also brings to the fore a quixotic, Utopian element 
in romantic hermeneutics, manifested in its proponents' re- 
liance on reason as a sole means of social reconstruction. The 
romanticists vastly underestimated the resilience of the bu- 
reaucratic state and the readiness of the extant powers to heed 
the demands of reason. Their confidence in the ability of all 
people, regardless of class, culture, and ethnic heritage, to 
come together on ideologically neutral grounds of reason was 
badly shattered by the flow of history. The logistics of awak- 
ening and self-transcendence proved to be far more complex 
than their optimistic declarations implied. And so it should 
come as no surprise that, when the revolutionary tide of the 
1840s subsided without bringing down the much-despised in- 
stitutions, a crisis of romantic thought ensued. The decline of 
romanticism in the midnineteenth century was in large mea- 
sure a product of a disillusionment with the efficacy of idealism 
as a means of social reconstruction. The mood of hopelessness 
palpable everywhere in Europe at this time accelerated the 
dissolution of romanticism, which, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, broke into several divergent, ideologically 
incompatible currents of thought. Marx's historical mate- 
rialism, Morris's guild socialism, and Bakunin's anarchism 
represented the movement o the left from the romantic en- 
ter; the volkish mysticism and racial theories of Lagarde, 
Langbehn, and List reflected the parallel movement to the 
right. The materialist, urban, and internationalist views of the 
former contrasted with the conservative, nationalist, and mili- 
tantly antimodernist leanings of the latter. Both the left- and 
right-wing successors of the romantic movement urned away 
from the mediatory spirit of romantic hermeneutics, embrac- 
ing the spirit of partisanship and showing an increasing readi- 
ness to employ violence as a vehicle of social change. And the 
heritage of romantic hermeneutics? It received a new lease on 
life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thanks 
90 Ricoeur, Philosophy, p. 234. 
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to the efforts of Wilhelm Dilthey and a brilliant pleiad of his 
German and American disciples who resurrected the spirit of 
romantic idealism in the tradition of interpretative social sci- 
ence. 
Romanticism and Early-Twentieth-Century 
Interpretative Sociology 
The impact of romantic ideas on modern social thought was 
facilitated by the revival of interest in transcendental idealism, 
which shaped much of the intellectual landscape in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in both Europe and 
the United States. This impact was felt most immediately in 
the program of cultural studies initiated by Dilthey and 
popularized by Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, and Max 
Weber. It is also clearly discernible in early American sociol- 
ogy, which derived its inspiration at least in part from its 
German counterpart. "The purest vein of Romanticism in 
American sociology," points out Gouldner, "is ... to be found 
in the 'Chicago School,' which had the most concentrated 
exposure to the German tradition and was, in fact, established 
by many (A. W. Small, W. Y. Thomas and R. E. Park) who 
were directly trained in it."91 We may add to this that Mead, a 
lifelong student of romantic philosophy, studied with Dilthey 
and at one time seriously contemplated writing a dissertation 
under his guidance, while Cooley, himself not a Chicagoan but 
a figure influential among the Chicago inter actionists, was a 
strong advocate of "sympathetic understanding" - a procedure 
bearing an uncanny resemblance to the method of Verstehen. 
The proponents of cultural science and social interactionism 
91 Gouldner, For Sociology, p. 345. The impact of idealist thought on interactionist 
sociology is discussed in Dmitri N. Shalin, "The Genesis of Social Interactionism and 
Differentiation of Macro- and Microsociological Paradigms," Humboldt Journal of Social 
Relations 6 (1978): 3-38, and "Pragmatism and Social Interactionism," American 
Sociological Review 51 (1986). 
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shared ground with a contemporaneous current of thought 
sometimes referred to as neoromanticism, which was particu- 
larly strong in Germany, although some elements of it can be 
detected in the Populist and the Progressive movements in the 
United States. Its distinguishing characteristics included a 
keen concern for the ossifying propensities of bureaucratic 
rationalization, an aversion to rationalism and dualism, and a 
strong interest in romantic organicism, all of which contrib- 
uted to the makings of interpretative sociology. The affinity 
between the two, however, was only partial: the interpretative 
thinkers refused to endorse the irrationalism and antimod- 
ernism that became the mainstream of neoromanticism inthis 
century, remaining closely attuned to the mediatory spirit of 
romantic idealism. The extent of their indebtedness to this 
spirit can be gleaned from the numerous allusions scattered 
throughout their works. 
Dilthey credited Schleiermacher's hermeneutics as an inspi- 
ration for his own cultural studies. Simmel quoted extensively 
and approvingly from the romantic sources and traced his 
notion of "qualitative individuality" to the romantic premise 
that the individual is "a 'compendium' of mankind." Rickert 
repeatedly stressed that cultural sciences derived their con- 
cepts from the German idealist philosophers. Weber effec- 
tively endorsed romantic epistemology in his theory of ideal 
type. And Mead credited romantic idealists with the original 
insight into the dialectic of self and other. 
Philosophically, interpretative sociology can be seen as a 
systematic application of romantic idealism to social reality. 
The very form of Simmel's famous query "How is society 
possible?" reminds us of Kant's "How is nature possible?" His 
answer was that the objective structure of the social world is 
isomorphous with, and incomprehensible without, the a priori 
forms of the mind, although in the case of social reality the 
mind in question is not just that of an external observer, of a 
sociologist, but the mind of historical individuals comprising a 
given society. In Simmel's words, "Societal unification eeds 
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no factors outside its own component elements, the individu- 
als. . . . The unity of society is directly realized by its own 
elements because these elements are themselves conscious and 
synthesizing units."92 The object of interpretative social sci- 
ence is "the mind-constructed world" or social reality insofar 
as it is brought into existence through the constitutive work of 
individuals consciously generating the social world in terms of 
their taken-for-granted beliefs and values. This object calls for 
a special method of inquiry, the method of Verstehen, which is 
rooted in the assumption that "knowledge of cultural events is 
inconceivable except on a basis of the significance which the 
concrete constellations of reality have for us in certain con- 
crete individual situations."93 The American interactionists 
sounded a similar note, contending that a key question for a 
sociologist studying human behavior - "What does it mean?" 
- can be answered only through "an imaginary recon- 
struction of life,"94 that sociologists should not "follow . . . 
uncritically the example of the physical sciences, [for] while 
the effect of a physical phenomenon depends exclusively on 
the objective nature of this phenomenon . . ., the effect of the 
social phenomenon depends in addition on the subjective 
standpoint taken by the individual or the group. . . ,"95 
The interpretative approach reveals the familiar circular 
pattern consistent with the hermeneutical thesis that the whole 
must be understood in terms of its individual parts, individual 
parts in terms of the whole. Like their romantic predecessors, 
the interpretative thinkers sought to bring into one continuum 
mind, self, and society. Man, according to them, is a product 
and producer of society; society is social intercourse or a 
92 Georg Simmel, Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 7. 
93 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949), p. 
80. 
94 C. H. Cooley, "The Roots of Social Knowledge," American Journal of Sociology 32 
(1926): 68, 77. 
95 W. I. Thomas, W. I. Thomas on Social Organization and Social Personality: Selected 
Papers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 272. 
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universe of discourse. Following the principles of romantic 
hermeneutics, the interpretative thinkers hifted the focus of 
sociological inquiry from macro- to microsocial phenomena. 
They did not thereby abandon the study of macrosocial for- 
mations (as Weber's analysis of Western capitalism would 
readily testify); they simply endeavored to telescope these into 
the meaningful actions of individuals: 
Such concepts as "state," association," "feudalism," and the like 
designate certain categories of human actions. Hence it is the 
task of sociology to reduce those concepts to "understandable" 
action, that is, without exception to the actions of participating 
individual men.96 
Society is certainly not a substance, nothing concrete but an 
event. . . . The relation between society and the individual isan 
organic relation. . . The mind is social, . . . society is mental, . . . 
society and the mind are aspects of the same whole. . .97 
Given these substantive parallels, one should not be sur- 
prised to find a deep ideological affinity between the propo- 
nents of interpretative social science and their romantic pred- 
ecessors. The mediatory spirit of romantic hermeneutics per- 
meates the entire edifice of interpretative and interactionist 
thought. It is evident in Weber's rejection of the "ethics of 
ultimate nds" with its belief in the efficacy of the last violent 
deed and his undivided commitment to the "ethics of respon- 
sibility." It bulks large in Dewey's ethics of means and his 
crusade on behalf of "great community." It shows in Simmel's 
criticism of "negative freedom" and Mead's advocacy of "in- 
ternational mindedness." Inherent in the ideological positions 
of all these thinkers is a longing for social change free of 
violence and revolutionary upheavals, a desire to undermine 
the political appeal of the Right and the Left that was on the 
96 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1946), p. 55. 
"' Charles Horton Cooley, Human ¡Mature and me òocial Urder (lyuz) (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1964), pp. 35, 81. 
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rise at the time in both the Old and the New Worlds. We may 
recall that the principal task of the Verein für Sozialpolitik was 
"to achieve by more conservative means the social justice at 
which the Marxists aimed. . . ."98 The same desire to rectify 
the injustices endemic to laissez-faire liberalism informs the 
progressive agenda of American interactionists. To combat the 
ills of modernity, the latter openly used the romantic ploy of 
juxtaposing the idealized past to the conditions of the present. 
The community of the past they chose as a point of reference 
was not the medieval social order but the native, rural, Jeffer- 
sonian community, yet the virtues they ascribed to it - 
continuity, liberty, participation, cooperation - were the old 
romantic virtues of free discourse, of Gemeinschaft. German 
interpretative thinkers were less apt to invoke the vision of the 
golden past as an antidote to the wretched conditions of the 
present (in part because of the indiscriminate use made of it 
by the neoromantics), but their critique of the "iron cage" of 
modern bureaucratic civilization had more than a tinge of 
nostalgia for the bygone era of the true Gemeinschaft. 
Whatever the differences, it was clearly the ideal of free 
discourse that inspired the political imaginations of inter- 
pretative thinkers on the Continent and in the United States. 
What these authors strained to assert is that, however 
alienated the social intercourse, it is still our discourse, and it is 
up to us, the participants in this discourse, to change its course 
and to transform it into a truly "universal" discourse. We can 
do so, the interpretative thinkers believed, and we can do so 
without recourse to violence, by subjecting to critical examina- 
tion the rational grounds of our discourse, by reevaluating 
values and supplanting them with the new and more rational 
ones. 
To sum up, early-twentieth-century interpretative sociology 
was an attempt to extend the principles of romantic her- 
meneutics to the entire domain of the social sciences. Its object 
98 H. Stewart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Réorientation of European Social 
Thought, 1890-1930 (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 294. 
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was the production of social reality as objective and meaning- 
ful; its major premise - the interdetermination freason and 
society; its methodological tool - interpretative understanding; 
and its ideal - free discourse. With this shift in perspective, the 
focus of sociological analysis became microscopic, not in the 
sense that society as a whole moved out of the reach of inter- 
pretative thinkers, but in the sense that the whole of society 
was to be systematically reduced to the predicative activities 
and rational schemes of understanding employed by its mem- 
bers. A priori categories and values are the means of produc- 
tion of social reality as objective and meaningful; using them 
skillfully and knowledgeably, members of society impart 
rational-logical qualities to reality, wade through the uncer- 
tainties of daily life, confer on each other social status, and in 
the process of doing so perpetuate the social order. To the 
participants of social intercourse this order appears as a thing 
in itself, a superhuman entity beyond their control and power. 
But this is only an appearance. The social order, with all its 
rigidities and inequities, is a product of human intercourse 
which produces individuals as historical individuals at the 
same time that it is produced by them as the historical uni- 
verse of discourse. The structure of the social order is pe- 
riodically exploded by prophets and charismatic leaders 
whose reflexive power lifts the veils thrown over the tran- 
scendental domain of a priori beliefs and values and forces 
humans to realize their responsibility for the way things are. 
The task of interpretative sociology is to aid in this process of 
démystification. But since this process never ends - bringing 
down old reifications clears the way for the new ones - the task 
of interpretative sociology is a never-ending one. That is to 
say, démystification is a Sisyphean labor that must begin anew 
the moment it is completed, and so the task of hermeneutically 
grounded social science is to ensure that this transcendence 
remains an ongoing endeavor. 
There is a characteristic fusion of the normative and the 
descriptive endemic to the project of sociological hermeneutics 
This content downloaded from 131.216.164.152 on Tue, 16 Jul 2013 14:28:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
122 SOCIAL RESEARCH 
and manifested in its idealistic approach that first imputes a 
"true" essence to the individual and society and then proceeds 
to demonstrate how this essence, perverted in the existent 
reality, can be recovered through self-conscious efforts of in- 
dividuals. The individual, according to this mode of reason- 
ing, is a species being, albeit reduced to a specimen; society is 
discourse, albeit reified and compulsive. What is, is judged 
here by the standards of what ought to be, and what ought to 
be is proferred as an ideal that is bound to come about when 
men begin to live up to their true essence. This fusion of the 
normative and the descriptive is the legacy of transcendental 
idealism, the legacy inherited by twentieth-century interpreta- 
tive thinkers and amply manifested in their abhorrence of 
violence, commitment to liberty and order, and penchant for 
political mediation and meliorism. The interpretative thinkers 
did not abandon their trust in reason and peaceful means 
of social reconstruction when revolutions swept over 
Europe and violence seemed the only solution to the vexing 
problems of modernity. We have every reason to call their 
thinking Utopian (in the sense in which the term was used by 
Mannheim), but we cannot deny their humanism or the rele- 
vance of their ideas to contemporary political discourse. The 
hermeneutical perspective on society as a universe of discourse 
perpetuated by self-conscious individuals reflects its propo- 
nents' profound trust in the freedom and dignity of man. It is 
an outlook permeated with humanistic values shared by those 
who believe in the possibility of a community that combines 
unity and diversity. 
It is also an outlook that is flawed by certain biases, a 
perspective with blind spots of its own. If the social process is 
fundamentally a process of production of social reality as 
objective and meaningful, as interpretative sociologists imply, 
then the questions to ponder are: What are the means of 
production of social reality as objective and meaningful? Who 
controls these means of production? How is participation in 
social discourse affected by one's status and class? How is the 
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process of universalization and generation structured? Which 
are the historically specific modes of production of social 
reality as objective and meaningful? All these questions are of 
paramount sociological importance. The failure to meet them 
head-on typical of much of interpretative sociology makes it 
vulnerable to the charges of an astructural and conservative 
bias. 
Is this failure a legacy of romantic idealism? That the 
idealistic tendency to exaggerate the claims of reason, to mix 
the real with the ideal, and to treat the subject of the historical 
process as a unitary phenomenon might have contributed to it 
is undeniable. That hermeneutically grounded social theory is 
inherently incapable of answering these pertinent sociological 
questions is far from certain. A reexamination of Marx's 
romantic heritage now under way suggests that romantic her- 
meneutics is not incompatible with class analysis." The cur- 
rent debate about Lukács's romantic period also points in this 
direction.100 Anthony Giddens's work is one more example of 
recent attempts to combine structural and hermeneutical 
analysis.101 Whether these efforts will bear fruit remains to be 
seen. One thing is clear, however: If interpretative sociology is 
to succeed as a full-fledged sociological theory, it has to ad- 
dress these questions directly, that is, it has to deal with issues 
of inequality and exploitation, and it has to maintain a fruitful 
dialogue with alternative sociological perspectives. 
* This is a revision of a paper presented at the 78th Annual Meeting of the American 
Sociological Association. I wish to express my gratitude to Professors Peter Berger, Ira 
Cohen, David Zaret, and Lon Shelby for their comments on an earlier draft. 
101 Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Inter- 
pretative Sociologies (New York: Basic Books, 1976). 
100 Breines, "Marxism"; Löwy, Goerg Lukács. 
99 P. Breines, "Marxism, Romanticism, and the Case of Georg Lukács: Notes on 
Some Recent Sources and Situations," Studies in Romanticism 16 (1971). 
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